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VIRGINIA'S 'AFFILIATED TRANSACTIONS' STATUTE:
INDULGING FORM OVER SUBSTANCE IN SECOND
GENERATION TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
Stanley K. Joynes, III*
Steven J. Keeler**
I. INTRODUCTION

With the enactment of the new Virginia Stock Corporation Act 1
during the 1985 Session of the General Assembly, Virginia joined
forces with Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in adopting second
generation state antitakeover regulation.2 The new Act includes an
antitakeover provision specifically designed to avoid the constitutional infirmities which have proved fatal to first generation stat* Partner, Rilee, Cantor, Arkema & Edmonds, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1977, University
of Virginia; J.D., 1981, University of Virginia. Mr. Joynes, by his own account, frequently
speaks and writes on subjects of which he possesses little knowledge.
** Associate, Rilee, Cantor, Arkema & Edmonds, Richmond, Virginia; B.B.A., 1983, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1986, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-601 to -777 (Repl. Vol. 1985). For an analysis of the new Act, see
Murphy, The New Virginia Stock CorporationAct: A Primer,20 U. RICH. L. REv. 67 (1985).
2. At least ten states, including Virginia, have adopted second generation takeover statutes. Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania provide the three basic models.
The Maryland statute imposes supermajority voting requirements and fair price provisions on certain "business combinations," and has been followed by Virginia, Connecticut,
Michigan, Indiana, and Kentucky. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West
Cum. Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-8.4 (Burns 1984); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
271A.396-.398 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1986); MD. CoRPs. & ASS'N CODE ANN. §§
3-601 to -603 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.17751784 (West Cum. Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (Repl. Vol. 1985) (analyzed herein). For a detailed analysis of the Maryland approach, see Scriggins & Clarke,
Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266 (1984).
The Ohio statute imposes voting requirements on acquisitions of controlling blocks of
target shares, and has been followed by Wisconsin and Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80B.01-.13 (West 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01-.831 (Baldwin 1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180-725 (West Cum. Supp. 1986); see also Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation?
Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 108 (1983); Note, Minnesota's Corporate TakeOver Act-"Still" Unconstitutional?,8 HANLINE L. REv. 255 (1985).
The Pennsylvania statute imposes certain restrictions on the voting rights of "interested
shareholders" while affording disinterested shareholders a right of redemption in certain
instances. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1409.1, 1910 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1986); see also
Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania ShareholderProtection Act: A New State Approach
to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW. 111 (1984); Sell, A CriticalAnalysis of
a New Approach to State Takeover Legislation After MITE, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 473 (1984).
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utes.3 A primary target of the new provision is the so-called "frontend loaded, two-tiered tender offer,"' 4 a modern day corporate
takeover technique thought by some to be inherently coercive and
unfair to nontendering minority shareholders.
This article presents a brief summary of the operation and
objectives of Virginia's second generation statute., While the new

statute is less vulnerable to judicial invalidation than Virginia's
first generation law, significant questions concerning the statute's
constitutionality remain." In addition, the article suggests that any
form of state regulation that effectively proscribes two-tiered
tender offers is contrary to true shareholder interests and sound
economic policy. 7 Ultimately, the new antitakeover provision fails
to distinguish properly the interests of shareholders from those of
corporate management.8
II.

THE AFFILIATED TRANSACTIONS PROVISION

The pertinent section of the new Virginia Stock Corporation Act
is Article 14, entitled "Affiliated Transactions."" The drafters
3. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
The new provision is located in Article Fourteen and entitled "Affiliated Transactions."
At least to some extent, the affiliated transactions provision is a legislative response to the
constitutional assaults on Virginia's first generation statute, the "Take-Over-Bid Disclosure
Act," VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (Repl. Vol. 1985). While that statute is not the
focus of this article, its relevance is considered at a later point herein. See infra notes 50-56
and accompanying text.
4. One student commentator provides a succinct explanation of this takeover method:
In a front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer, the acquiring company offers to buy, at
a premium price, only enough shares to establish a controlling position in the target
company. Typically, the offeror accumulates up to five percent of the target's stock
through open market purchases, and then makes a tender offer for enough of the
outstanding shares to give it voting control. Once it gains control of the target, the
offeror merges the target into itself or a subsidiary and freezes out the target's remaining shareholders by forcing them to accept cash or securities valued at a lower
price per share than the original tender offer price.
Comment, The Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offer, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 811, 812
(1983) [hereinafter Comment, Front-End Loaded]; see also Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 548 (1978); Comment,
Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 389-92 (1982).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 9-46.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 47-87.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-99.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 106-113.
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (Repl. Vol. 1985). While the general effective date
for the Virginia Stock Corporation Act was January 1, 1986, Article 14 became effective
June 1, 1985. Although the new Virginia Act borrows in significant part from the REVISED
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sought to temper perceived inequities in the two-tiered tender offer process by structuring the statute as a seemingly traditional
regulation of the internal affairs of Virginia corporations. 10 In
striking contrast to first generation laws, the statute does not directly regulate any aspect of the first-step tender offer in a twotiered takeover; instead, it imposes restrictions only on the secondstep freeze-out merger."
A. Mechanics of the Statute
1. Scope: Affiliated Transactions
The statute broadly defines an "affiliated transaction" as any
merger," share exchange, 13 disposition of assets constituting in excess of five percent of total fair market value, 1 4 guarantee of indebtedness in excess of five percent of the total market value of
corporate assets,' 5 sale or other disposition of voting shares having
a fair market value in excess of five percent of all outstanding voting shares,"
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1983), the MODEL ACT contains no counterpart to Article 14.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
11. This distinction implicates the constitutional validity of the statute and is discussed
at a later point. See infra text accompanying notes 58-87.
12. More specifically, an affiliated transaction includes "[a]ny merger of the corporation
or any of its subsidiaries with any interested shareholder." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (Repl.
Vol. 1985).
13. The statute includes any share exchange "pursuant to § 13.1-717 of this Act in which
any interested shareholder acquires one or more classes or series of voting shares of the
corporation or any of its subsidiaries." Id.
14. An "affiliated transaction" includes:
Except for transactions in the ordinary course of business, (i) any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition (in one transaction or a series
of transactions during any twelve-month period) to or with any interested shareholder of any assets of the corporation or of any of its subsidiaries having an aggregate fair market value in excess of five percent of the corporation's consolidated assets as of the date of the most recently available financial statements ...
Id. Fair market value, in the case of property other than cash or shares, is defined as the fair
market value of such property on the date in question as determined by a majority of the
disinterested directors. Id.
15. An "affiliated transaction" includes:
Except for transactions in the ordinary course of business . . . (ii) any guaranty by
the corporation or any of its subsidiaries (in one transaction or a series of transactions during any twelve-month period) of indebtedness of any interested shareholder
in an amount in excess of five percent of the corporation's consolidated assets as of
the date of the most recently available financial statements.
Id.
16. An "affiliated transaction" also includes:
The sale or other disposition by the corporation or any of its subsidiaries to an inter-
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dissolution 17 or reclassification of securities" which, in turn, involves or implicates an impact upon an interested shareholder. An
"interested shareholder" is defined as any person who is the beneficial owner"9 of more than ten percent of the outstanding voting
ested shareholder (in one transaction or a series of transactions during any twelvemonth period) of any voting shares of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries having an aggregate fair market value in excess of five percent of the aggregate fair market value of all outstanding voting shares of the corporation as of the determination
date except pursuant to a share dividend or the exercise of rights or warrants distributed or offered on a basis affording substantially proportionate treatment to all holders of the same class or series of voting shares ....
Id.
The statute defines fair market value as follows:
In the case of shares, the highest closing sale price of a share quoted during the
thirty-day period immediately preceding the date in question on the composite tape
for shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange or, if such shares are not quoted
on the composite tape on the New York Stock Exchange or, if such shares are not
listed on such exchange, on the principal United States securities exchange registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on which such shares are listed, or, if such
shares are not listed on any such exchange, the highest closing bid quotation with
respect to a share during the thirty-day period preceding the date in question on the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., automated quotations system or any
similar system then in general use, or, if no such quotations are available, the fair
market value of a share on the date in question as determined by a majority of the
disinterested directors ....
Id.
17. More specifically, the statute contemplates the dissolution of the corporation "if proposed by or on behalf of an interested shareholder.
... Id.
18. An "affiliated transaction" also includes:
Any reclassification of securities, including any reverse stock split, or recapitalization
of the corporation, or any merger of the corporation with any of its subsidiaries or
any distribution or other transaction, whether or not with or into or otherwise involving an interested shareholder, which has the effect, directly or indirectly (in one
transaction or a series of transactions during any twelve-month period), of increasing
by more than five percent the percentage of the outstanding voting shares of the
corporation or any of its subsidiaries beneficially owned by any interested shareholder
who has not been an interested shareholder for at least five years before the date of
such transaction.
Id.
19. The "Affiliated Transactions" statute includes voting power, investment power, and
the right to acquire either of these in its definition of "beneficial owner":
A person is deemed to be a "beneficial owner" of voting shares as to which such
person and such person's affiliates and associates, individually or in the aggregate,
have or share directly, or indirectly through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise:
1. Voting power, which includes the power to vote or to direct the voting or the
voting shares;
2. Investment power, which includes the power to dispose or to direct the disposition of the voting shares; or
3. The right to acquire voting power or investment power, whether such right is
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shares. 20 Thus, the statute applies to any of a variety of material
transactions between the corporation and certain potentially dominant shareholders.
2. Special Voting Requirements
Following the Maryland approach,21 the Virginia statute imposes
supermajority voting requirements with certain specified exceptions 22 on those second-step transactions falling within the purview
of the term "affiliated transaction.

23

Specifically, the statute pro-

vides that "an affiliated transaction shall be approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares
other than shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder."2 This requirement necessitates approval by the disinterested shareholders before the interested shareholder can accomplish a second-step freeze out of the minority shareholders who
failed to tender in the first step or initial offer. The statute gives a
majority of the "disinterested directors" the authority to determine: (1) whether a person is an interested shareholder, associate,
or affiliate; (2) the number of voting shares beneficially owned by
any such person; and (3) the relevant amounts and market values
of voting stock, corporate assets and; (4) whether the amount of
indebtedness guaranteed that may be the subject of an affiliated
transaction constitutes more than five percent of the consolidated
assets of the corporation.25
exercisable immediately or only after the passage of time, pursuant to any contract,
arrangement, or understanding, upon the exercise of conversion rights, exchange
rights, warrants, or options, or otherwise; provided, that in no case shall a director of
the corporation be deemed to be the beneficial owner of voting shares beneficially
owned by another director of the corporation solely by reason of actions undertaken
by such persons in their capacity as directors of the corporation.
Id.
20. Note, however, that the statute specifically excludes from the definition of "interested
shareholder": (1) the corporation or any of its subsidiaries, (2) any savings, employee stock
ownership, or other employee benefit plan of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or (3)
any fiduciary with respect to any such plan when acting in such capacity. Id.
21. See MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-602 (Repl. Vol. 1985); see also Scriggins &
Clarke, supra note 2, at 273.
22. See infra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-726(A) (Repl. Vol. 1985). The special vote is required "in addi-

tion to any affirmative vote required by any other section of this Act or by the articles of
incorporation." Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. § 13.1-726(B). The statute defines a "disinterested director" as to any particular
interested shareholder:
(i) any member of the board of directors of the corporation who was a member of the
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The special voting requirements are subject to six statutory exceptions. First, if the "affiliated transaction has been approved by
a majority of the disinterested directors," the need for a shareholder vote is eliminated.2" Second, the special voting requirements
are not applicable to relatively small or closely held corporations
(i.e., those that have not had "more than 300 shareholders of record at any time during the 3 years preceding the announcement
date." 27 Third, no special vote is required if "the interested shareholder has been the beneficial owner of at least eighty percent of
the corporation's outstanding voting shares for at least five years
preceding the announcement date. '28 Fourth, a shareholder's vote
is likewise not required if "the interested shareholder is the beneficial owner of at least ninety percent of the outstanding voting
shares of the corporation."29 And fifth, the supermajority voting
requirements are not applicable to investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.0
board of directors before the later of January 1, 1985, and the determination date
and, (ii) any member of the board of directors of the corporation who was recommended for election by, or was elected to fill a vacancy and received the affirmative
vote of, a majority of the disinterested directors then on the board.
Id. § 13.1-725. The "determination date," in turn, means the date on which an interested
shareholder became an interested shareholder. Id.
26. Id. § 13.1-727(1). Thus, this exception grants the disinterested directors the discretion
to avoid application of the statute altogether. "Consequently, a 'friendly' acquisition
through tender offer and merger, or merger alone, approved by the requisite percentage of
disinterested directors, escapes the special voting rule .
Murphy, supra note 1, at 126
n.154.
27. VA. ConE ANN. § 13.1-727(2) (emphasis added).

The "announcement date" means the date of the first general public announcement
of the proposed affiliated transaction or of the intention to propose an affiliated
transaction or the date on which the proposed affiliated transaction or the intention
to propose an affiliated transaction is first communicated generally to shareholders of
the corporation, whichever is earlier.
Id. § 13.1-725.
28. Id. § 13.1-727(3).
29. Id. § 13.1-727(4). For purposes of this ninety percent ownership exception, the statute
excludes "shares acquired directly from the corporation in a transaction not approved by a
majority of the disinterested directors." Id.
30. Id. § 13.1-727(5).
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b. "Fair Price" Exception
The sixth and, perhaps, most noteworthy exception to the special voting requirements of Article 14 is contained in the so-called
"fairness" provisions of the statute.3 1 Similar fairness prerequisites
are found in the Maryland statute. One commentator explains:
These requirements are designed to protect minority shareholders
by guaranteeing that they will receive the same consideration for
their stock in the second step of the two-tiered takeover that the
majority received in the tender offer. Some of the fairness prerequisites relate to price, and others relate to non-price aspects of the
transaction.2
While an exhaustive discussion of the fair price provisions is beyond the scope of this article, the essential components of the exception warrant consideration. To begin with, the statute requires
that the value of the consideration for each class of voting shares
received in the affiliated transaction equal at least the highest of
the following: (1) the highest per share price paid by the interested
shareholder for any shares acquired within the two-year period
preceding the announcement date or in the transaction in which
the shareholder became an interested shareholder, whichever is
higher; 33 (2) the fair market value of such shares on the announcement date or on the determination date, whichever is higher;34 (3)
such fair market value multiplied by a specified statutory ratio;35
and (4) the highest preferential amount, if any, to which the hold31. Id. § 13.1-727(6). For the observation that this exemption is "designed to protect Virginia corporations from front-loaded, two-tiered takeovers," see Murphy, supra note 1, at
126 n.155.
32. Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 2, at 276-77.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-7 2 7(6)(a)(1) (RepI. Vol. 1985). Share price includes "any brokerage commissions, transfer taxes, and soliciting dealers' fees." Id.
34. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(a)(2).
35. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(a)(3). The statute provides:
If applicable, the price per share equal to the fair market value of such class or series
determined pursuant to paragraph 6(a)(2) of this subsection, multiplied by the ratio
of (i) the highest per share price including any brokerage commissions, transfer taxes,
and soliciting dealers fees, paid by the interested shareholder for any shares of such
class or series acquired by it within the two-year period immediately preceding the
announcement date to (ii) the fair market value per share of such class or series on
the first day in such two-year period on which the interested shareholder acquired
any shares of such class or series.
Id. This ratio represents the highest premium paid by the interested shareholder for any
voting shares during the preannouncement period.
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ers are entitled in the event of dissolution of the corporation.

6

In addition to these price conditions, the fairness exception to
the special voting requirements provides that the consideration received by the stockholders shall be cash or "the same form as the
interested shareholder has previously paid."3 Furthermore, during
that portion of the three-year period preceding the announcement
date that thi interested shareholder was, in fact, an interested
shareholder: (1) periodic dividends must have been declared and
paid on the regular dates;38 (2) there cannot have been any reduction in the annual rate of dividends paid on any class and there
must have been an increase in such annual rate as was necessary to
reflect any transaction which reduced the number of outstanding
shares;39 and (3) the interested shareholder must not have acquired
any additional shares. 40 Also during such period, the interested
shareholder must not have "received the benefit" of any loans, advances, financial assistance or any tax advantages provided by the
corporation. 41 Finally, a "proxy or information statement describing the affiliated transaction and complying with the requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" must be mailed to the
shareholders at least twenty-five days prior to consummation of
the transaction.42
4. Application of Article 14
The statute expressly provides that it shall not apply "to any
corporation that adopts an amendment of its articles of incorpora' 43
tion stating that this article shall not apply to the corporation.
36. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(a)(4).
37. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(b). If the interested shareholder has paid for shares with varying
forms of consideration, the form of the consideration will be either cash or the form used to
acquire the largest number of shares previously acquired by the interested shareholder. Id.
38. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(c)(1). This requirement applies whether or not the dividends are
cumulative. Id.
39. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(c)(2). Here, the statute refers to reclassification transactions such as
reverse stock splits, recapitalizations, or reorganizations.
40. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(c)(3). Excluded are any additional shares acquired as part of the
transaction which resulted in the interested shareholder becoming an interested shareholder. Id.
41. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(d). An exception is made for such receipts as are approved by a
majority of the disinterested directors, as well as for benefits received "proportionately as a
shareholder." Id.
42. Id. § 13.1-727(6)(e). Mailing of the proxy is mandatory whether or not required by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
43. Id. § 13.1-728(A).
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Such an amendment, or a subsequent one repealing it, requires the
"affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares
other than shares beneficially owned by any interested
shareholder."""
B.

PrincipalObjective

The Joint Bar Committee explained that Article 14 "is designed
to limit the likelihood that someone can acquire a controlling block
of the outstanding shares and then use his voting power to squeeze
out the remaining shareholders at a price that does not reflect the

fair value of their shares."4 5 Clearly, the statute is premised on a
negative view of the two-tiered takeover technique. For reasons

that will be discussed in the following section, the statute's direct
regulatory impact is restricted to the second-step merger of such a

takeover-to "transactions that state law has traditionally required to be approved by stockholder vote and transactions that
involve a conflict of interest."46 The statute's practical effect is to
require the approval of either the disinterested shareholders or disinterested directors or, alternatively, compliance with some rather
demanding fairness prerequisites before certain controlling shareholders can freeze out minority shareholders.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY

Article 14 of the new Act exemplifies the response of state legis-

latures to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.4 7 MITE appeared to spell the end for first generation
44. Id. § 13.1-728(A), (B).
45. VA. CORPORATION LAW 232 (1985 ed.) (Joint Bar Committee Commentary to VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-725).
The source of the Article is the growing concern about the unfairness to minority
shareholders that can result when a dominant shareholder proposes to engage in a
significant transaction with the corporation where his control may enable him to
cause the corporation to enter into the transaction even though it may not be in the
best interest of the shareholders.
Id.
46. Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 2, at 273. The statute "regulates only the new majority's use of the statutory voting provisions to force out the minority at a low price. Thus, [it]
prevents acquiring stockholders from using the voting provisions of a modern general corporation statute in a context for which they were never intended." Id. at 267 (describing the
Maryland Act, after which the Virginia statute is modeled).
47. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). In MITE, a Delaware corporation which had initiated a tender
offer for all outstanding shares of an Illinois-based company, sought a declaratory judgment
in federal district court that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act was preempted by the
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state antitakeover statutes which seek to regulate directly the firststep tender offer of two-tiered takeovers. 48 Less than seven months
Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause. The Illinois Act required a tender offeror
to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to initiate a tender
offer, and to specify the terms thereof, at least 20 days prior to the effective date of such
offer. During that 20-day period, the statute prohibited the offeror from communicating its
terms to the target's shareholders. Target management was free to provide information to
its shareholders regarding the offer. In addition, the Illinois Act required registration of all
takeover offers with the Secretary of State. The Illinois statute applied when 10% of a target company's shareholders were Illinois residents or alternatively, when any two of the
following conditions were satisfied: (1) the target corporation's principal office was in Illinois; (2) the target was incorporated in the state; or (3) at least 10% of the target's stated
capital and paid-in surplus was represented within the state. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631-32.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute
and later issued a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. See generally Note,
State Takeover Statutes Under Attack-Casualties in the Battle for Corporate Control-MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DE.PAUL L. REV. 989 (1981) (discussing the Seventh Circuit
opinion); Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 62-71 (1982) (discussing the MITE case and its effect on state antitakeover statutes).
48. See Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 476 ("[O]nly a severely decimated statute can remain after
close constitutional scrutiny."); Comment, Tender Offers-Edgar v. MITE Corp. and State
Tender Offer Regulation, 9 J. CORP. L. 95, 112 (1983) ("[T]he [MITE] decision stands as a
serious, perhaps fatal blow to state regulation of tender offers."). Several court decisions
have already invalidated similar statutes. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1980) (the New Jersey antitakeover statute would probably be preempted on remand); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Natomas Co. v. Bryan,
512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (preliminary injunction issued against enforcement of Pennsylvania statute); Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981); Canadian Pac. Enters., Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp.
1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981); Hi-Shear Indus. v.
Campbell [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 97,804 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980);
Brascan, Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,247
(E.D. La. April 30, 1979); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (1981);
Eure v. Grand Metro. Ltd., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,694 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1980).
As many as thirty-six states have enacted takeover legislation at one time or another. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010 -.120 (1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-144 (Supp. 1986); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1151-101 to -108 (Supp. 1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-456 to -468 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. 417E-1 to 15 (1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1501 to -1514 (Cum. Supp. 1986); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-0.5 to -11 (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.101-.612 (West Cum. Supp.
1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1284 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:1500 -:1512 (West Supp. 1987); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985
& Cum. Supp. 1986); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (Law Co-op. 1985); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West 1986);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Cum. Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.566
(Vernon 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2418 to -2430 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 78.376-.3778 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :16 (Repl. Vol.
1983 & Cum. Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Cum. Supp. 1986); N.Y.
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after MITE was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared Virginia's first generation antitakeover statute unconstitutional.4 Thus, a brief examination of this statute, the "TakeOver-Bid Disclosure Act," 5° is relevant to consideration of the constitutionality of Virginia's second generation statute.
A. Virginia's First Generation Statute: The "Take-Over-Bid
Disclosure Act"
Virginia's first generation statute, the Take-Over-Bid Disclosure
Act, remains on the books, although suspicion regarding its constitutional validity has precipitated several legislative modifications
since its original enactment in 1968.51 There is extensive literature
challenging the constitutionality of first generation statutes that
directly regulate tender offers.52 The constitutional discussion below borrows from the traditional constitutional analysis applied to
Bus. CORP.

OHIO

LAW

GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1985);
1701.831 -.832 (Baldwin Supp. 1986); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§

§§ 1600-1614 (McKinney 1986); N.C.

REV. CODE ANN. §§

1408(B), 1409.1(c)(1)-(3) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); S.C.

CODE ANN.

§§ 35-2-10 to -130

(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -48 (1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-5-101 to -114 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -540
(Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01 to -.25 (1986 Special Pamphlet); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.036 (repealed 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, §§ 137.51-.70
(1981) (repealed 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.560-.991 (repealed 1986); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (repealed 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 431-450 (West Supp.
1983-1984) (repealed 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (repealed 1983).
For an insightful pre-MITE discussion of the constitutional validity of such statutes, see
Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,
45 FOEDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
49. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text.
Other post-MITE decisions include: Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250 (7th Cir. 1986); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983);
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); National City Lines v.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo.
1985); Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
50. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (Repl. Vol. 1985). See generally Gibson & Freeman, Business Associations, 54 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1968).
It is interesting to note that Virginia's first generation statute, which became effective
March 5, 1968, was the first state law regulating tender offers. See Note, State Regulation of
Tender Offers Reexamined, 19 TULSA L.J. 225, 232 (1983).
51. This statute was amended in 1970, 1978, 1979, 19R0 and 1983. See 1983 Va. Acts 408;
1980 Va. Acts 216; 1979 Va. Acts 200; 1978 Va. Acts 801; 1970 Va. Acts 527.
52. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellants, and Takeout Mergers:
The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am.B. FOUND. RES. J. 341, 344 nn.17 & 19, 346
n.26; Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83
COLu . L. REV. 249, 250 n.5, 251 n.10 (1983); Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover
Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 702 n.93 (1981).
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first generation laws. The conclusion is that the attempt to avoid
the infirmities of the first generation with the development of a
second generation has failed.53
The purpose of the Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act was "to protect the interests of offerees, investors and the public by requiring
that an offeror make fair, full and effective disclosure to offerees of
all information material to a decision to accept or reject a takeover bid." 54 Like many first generation statutes, Virginia's fell prey
to partial invalidation when, in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,55 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a provision of the
Act governing open market purchases and requiring the filing of a
statement of intent by the offeror with the State Corporation Commission and the target company. 56 The court found the particular
provision violative of the commerce clause insofar as it could affect
transactions between individuals outside of Virginia:
In sum, we think that the burden on interstate commerce created
by the 1980 amendment to Virginia's Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act
is a lesser one than the Illinois statute held invalid in MITE. But we
think that the protections purportedly offered Virginia shareholders
of Virginia corporations are too speculative5 to sustain the Virginia
statute's validity as it applies in this case. 7
Likewise, Virginia's recently enacted affiliated transactions provision is vulnerable to the same commerce and supremacy clause
53.
54.
55.
56.

See infra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 582. The provision invalidated VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii), amended by

1983 Va. Acts 408. Only a few years before that holding, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of this statute. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980).
57. Telvest, 697 F.2d at 582. The court took note of expert testimony which identified the
following deleterious economic effects of Virginia's efforts to regulate open market
purchases: (1) investment in Virginia companies would be discouraged by the increased cost
and uncertainties of investing; (2) the ability of a free market efficiently to price securities
and allocate resources would be impaired; and (3) the incentive to incumbent management
to perform well and thus support a high market price for the securities of the enterprise
would be reduced. Id. at 580.
The Act had enjoyed significant changes since its 1968 enactment. For discussions of
these changes and the development of this Act, see Note, Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, 12
U. RICH. L. REv. 749 (1978); Gibson & Freeman, supra note 50.
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attacks which were successfully leveled against first generation an58
titakeover statutes.
B.

Commerce Clause

State takeover legislation generally has been attacked as constitutionally invalid under both the commerce clause and the preemption doctrine.8 9 At the beginning of Edgar v. MITE Corp., the
Court, in its discussion of the commerce clause,60 explained that
while incidental regulation of interstate commerce by the states is
constitutionally permissible in certain circumstances, direct regulation is prohibited." A plurality of the Court found the Illinois Act
to be a direct restraint on interstate commerce insofar as it directly
regulated interstate tender offers.62 Thus, the Act was held to constitute an invalid direct regulation of interstate commerce having a
"sweeping extraterritorial effect. 6e3
The new Virginia statute, like many second generation ones, successfully avoids constitutional suspicion under this direct restraint
rationale. Indeed, the statute was structured specifically to avoid
such a classification and its provisions are reserved for the second58. See supra notes 48-49.
59. See generally Note, Second Step Transactions in Two-Tiered Takeovers: The Case
for State Regulation, 19 GA. L. REv. 343, 364 (1985).
60. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 8, cl.3 ("Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce
... among the several States."). For detailed discussions of commerce clause analysis in the
context of state takeover regulation, see Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation:Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Shipman, Some
Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE
IV. RES. 722 (1970); Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender
Offers, 47 S.CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974).
61. 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (citing Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199
(1925)).
62. Justices White, Blackmun, Burger, and Powell joined in this determination. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act required tender offerors to notify the Secretary of State and
the target company of their intent to make an offer and the offer's terms 20 days prior to
the offer becoming effective. MITE, 457 U.S. at 627. The opinion states:
The Illinois Act differs substantially from state blue-sky laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State
of Illinois. A tender offer for securities of a publicly held corporation is ordinarily
communicated by the use of the mails or other means of interstate commerce to
shareholders across the country and abroad. Securities are tendered and transactions
closed by similar means . . . . These transactions would themselves be interstate
commerce . . . . [T]he Act could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would
not affect a single Illinois shareholder.
Id. at 641-42.
63. Id. at 642; see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945) (striking
down a state statute on commerce clause grounds where the "practical effect of [the] regulation is to control [conduct] beyond the boundarieg of the state").
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step, traditionally intracorporate transaction. 4 The second part of
MITE's commerce clause analysis, however, may create significant
problems even for second generation statutes like Article 14.
Relying on the balancing test expounded in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 5 a majority of the MITE Court held the Illinois Act
to be unconstitutional albeit as a form of indirect regulation.6 6 In
the Court's view, the putative state interest in shareholder protection, as well as in regulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations, was "insufficient to outweigh the burdens" imposed on interstate commerce. 7 Justice White's elaboration as to these
burdens is particularly enlightening:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a
nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived
64. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11; see also Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 2,
at 289-90. Scriggins and Clarke note:
Because the new Maryland statute regulates the forced transaction stage of a takeover rather than the tender offer stage, its effect on the tender offer, and thus on
interstate commerce, is patently indirect. Therefore, even if the direct-indirect distinction continues to have significance in commerce clause jurisprudence, the Act is
safe from invalidation on that score.
Id. An alternate view is that such statutes successfully avoid "placing impermissible direct
restraints on interstate commerce" due to the fact that they do not "put conditions on
tender offers communicated across state lines, but [focus] primarily on the internal corporate affairs of companies incorporated within the state." Note, Second Generation State
Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 433, 455 (1984). Professor Sargent also observes:
[S]econd-generation statutes do not directly condition or restrain the tender offer or
the consequent tender of shares; instead, they readjust the target's internal ordering
mechanism in a way that will have a substantial impact on what can happen after the
tender offer is completed. In essence, the new direction shifts the focus from securities regulationto corporate law.
Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause?, 8 CoRP. L. REv. 3, 5 (1985) (emphasis added).
65. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The MITE opinion noted that "[a] state statute must be upheld
if it 'regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental. . . unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits'." 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting Pike,
397 U.S. at 142).
66. 457 U.S. at 643. Note that this was the only part of the MITE decision embraced by a
majority of the Justices.
"The MITE decision is not a model of judicial unanamity." Note, supra note 50, at 236.
For a discussion of the complex allocation of the Justices' votes in MITE, see Note, The
Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017,
1039-44 (1983); see also Comment, Front-End Loaded, supra note 4, at 830 ("The import of
the case, Edgar v. MITE Corp., is difficult to determine because the Court issued six different opinions.").
67. 457 U.S. at 643.
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of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process
which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced."8

It is uncertain whether Virginia's second generation statute can
successfully pass the Pike test for indirect restraints on commerce.
The question as to whether the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce are excessive in relation to the local interests served by
the statute must be answered in both constitutional and economic
terms. 9 As perceptively recognized by one commentator, "it is impossible to weigh the burdens on interstate commerce or to define
the nature and importance of the state interests without considering the economic arguments . . .regarding the structural role of
hostile takeovers in the corporate system."7 0
While the economic burdens imposed by the Virginia statute are
addressed in more detail in another section,7 ' it is sufficient to note
here that even second generation antitakeover laws discourage and
increase the cost of takeover attempts which serve both to improve
corporate resource allocation and to discipline inefficient management.7 2 Furthermore, the putative local interests which serve as a
68. Id. at 643. At this point, the opinion cites Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74
(1981). The authors embrace the views of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel and give them
further consideration in a subsequent section of this article. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 47-57 indicating the deleterious economic effects of
Virginia's first generation statute identified in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580
(4th Cir. 1983).
69. For purposes of organization, the authors have chosen to address in more detail the
economic criticisms of state takeover regulation in a subsequent section. See infra text accompanying notes 88-105.
70. Sargent, supra note 64, at 7. Professor Sargent suggests:
The burdens imposed on interstatecommerce and the benefits provided to the state
by internalaffairs regulationmust be defined and balanced in economic terms ....
This premise does not suggest that the Commerce Clause expresses a constitutional
preference for "free" markets or any other market structure. It suggests, instead, that
state attempts to regulate economic enterprise must be analyzed in economic terms.
Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
71. See infra text acompanying notes 88-105.
72. See generally Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail:Is New Legislation
Needed? 19 GA. L. REV. 281 (1985); Note, supra note 64, at 456-57 (suggesting that Maryland's second generation statute may be unconstitutional insofar as the state's interest in
"regulating corporate internal affairs and protecting investors may not offset the burdens
...[placed] on interstate commerce.")
The following statement was made about the Maryland second generation statute:
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justification for such legislation are questionable. In particular,
other commentators have suggested that state antitakeover statutes might be viewed appropriately as a form of economic protectionism. 3 Moreover, as suggested in MITE, a provision such as the
one in Virginia's statute, which exempts from statutory coverage a
corporation's acquisition of its own shares, cannot be reconciled
with the purported objective of shareholder protection. 4
Assuming that corporate takeovers are to be viewed as beneficial
to the workings of an otherwise free market,75 Virginia's second
generation statute arguably imposes economic burdens that outweigh the local interests which the statute's proponents claim it
[I]t burdens commerce by increasing the costs of corporate takeovers. Corporate takeovers may be desirable from the standpoint of interstate commerce because they
serve as a discipline on inefficient management. Business combinations after a takeover may improve resource allocation and produce economies of scale. The MITE
Court emphasized that these salutory effects are negated by antitakeover legislation.
Id. at 456 (citing MITE, 457 U.S. at 643); see also supra text accompanying note 68.
73. Professor Sargent has noted that:
What the state legislatures had in mind, .. was protection of local companies from
hostile takeovers. While this sentiment reflected a concern for protection of local jobs
rather than target management per se, such parochialism remains exactly what the
Commerce Clause was designed to prevent. The protectionist impulse that accounts
for much of the success of these statutes in the state legislatures thus could prove
fatal to them in the courts. The cases involving the first-generation statutes have
made it clear that this state "benefit" will not outweigh any burden imposed on interstate commerce.
Sargent, supra note 64, at 31-32.
The position that "the intention of the state statutes could only be the insulation of local
target companies from possible liquidation or relocation of corporate assets and the consequent loss of local revenue and employment" has also been advocated. Note, supra note 50,
at 244 (quoting Note, Securities Law and the Constitution:State Tender Offer Statutes
Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 520, 528 (1979); see also Langevoort, supra note 60, at 241-53;
Wilner & Landy, supra note 48, at 18; Note, supra note 64, at 457; Note, supra note 60, at
1159. In MITE, the Court doubted the shareholder protection interest because there was no
legitimate state interest in protecting non-resident shareholders. See Sell, supra note 2, at
478.
74. See supra note 20. The MITE Court explained:
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has
no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders ....
We note, furthermore, that the [Illinois] Act completely exempts from coverage a corporation's acquisition of its own shares ....

This distinction is at variance with Illinois' asserted

legislative purpose, and tends to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens
the statute imposes on interstate commerce.
457 U.S. at 644; see also Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 581 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting
that Virginia's first generation statute similarly exempts purchases by an issuer of its own
stock and citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(ii)); Kreider, supra note 2, at 122-23
("[d]iscussions are framed in terms of shareholder interest although all recognize these laws
are aimed at protecting incumbent management"); Note, supra note 2, at 267, 274.
75. See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
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furthers. 7 As a consequence, judicial application of the Pike test
will likely result in invalidation of Article 14, as well as other second generation statutes, as an indirect restraint on interstate commerce. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "MITE serves
as a warning that a state's mere claim that its takeover statute provides additional protection to resident shareholders will not be sufficient to outweigh the greater burden imposed on interstate com'7
merce as a result of the statute's extraterritorial impact." 7
C.

Preemption Doctrine: Conflict with Congressional Objectives

In Edgar v. MITE Corp., three Justices concluded that the Illinois Act was invalid under the supremacy clause."8 Holding that

the takeover statute was preempted by the Williams Act, 79 Justice
76. The potential extraterritorial reach of the statute alone may be deemed constitutionally unacceptable. For the observation that the "extraterritorial impact that is necessarily a
characteristic of state takeover statutes cannot be easily avoided" see Note, supra note 2, at
272. Professor Sargent points out that if one adheres to the view that takeovers serve to
allocate corporate assets to their optimal use and to discipline managers to maximize shareholder utility rather than their own, then second-generation statutes "cannot reasonably be
said to serve any legitimate state interest." Sargent, supra note 64, at 33.
77. Note, supra note 2, at 274. The commentator also noted that: "[tihe Court has served
notice that if a state's takeover statute even indirectly affects interstate commerce, some
additional, more pervasive local interest must be shown than was proffered by Illinois to
sustain the law against a constitutional challenge." Id. at 275. Virginia, in all likelihood, will
claim that its new statute serves the same interests that Illinois unsuccessfully cited in
MITE-the protection of resident stockholders and the regulation of the internal affairs of
domestic corporations. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
For the observation that the Maryland Act "raises novel Commerce Clause issues" and
that it might "reduce the aggregate number of takeover bids for Maryland corporations,"
see Sargent, supra note 64 at 11. Professor Sargent further notes:
The [second generation] statutes . . . all affect interstate commerce through conditioning the manner in which hostile takeovers are to be accomplished, raising the cost
of such takeovers, and altering the balance between the bidder and target management. They thus do not differ in this regard from the first generation statutes invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds in MITE.
Id. at 12-13.
78. 457 U.S. 624, 630-40 (Opinion of White, J., in which Burger, C.J., and Blackman, J.,
joined); see U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). For extensive treatment of the preemption doctrine, see generally Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978) [hereinafter Preemption Analysis];
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter Federalism and the Burger Court].
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982); see also L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 342-44 (1978); Note, Federalism and the Burger Court, supra note 78; Note,
PreemptionAnalysis, supra note 78. See generally Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing
the Takeover Game: The Securities and Exchange Commission's ProposedAmendments to
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White explained that, in enacting that federal legislation, Congress
sought to "strike a balance between the investor, management, and
the takeover bidder." 80 The opinion noted that a state statute is
void to the extent that it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'" Thus, insofar as the requirements of the Illinois statute
tipped the balance in favor of target management, the Justices
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that it conflicted with congressional objectives:
[T]he Williams Act was designed to protect shareholders and to preserve a neutral balance between incumbent management and offeror. Because state takeover statutes hinder the successful completion of tender offers by providing management with a powerful
weapon of delay, such statutes "[disrupt] the neutrality indispensable for the proper operation of the federal market approach," and
therefore "[stand] as ... obstacles to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the Williams Act."'
Virginia's second generation statute, with its special voting rethe Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 409, 412-21 (1980); Wilner & Landy, supra note 48,
at 23-24 (discussing the subtle and often ignored distinction between supremacy clause and
preemption analysis). The disclosure provisions of the Williams Act regulating tender offers
are embodied in amendments to sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
80. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634.
Congress enacted the Williams Act in 1968 to provide the target company shareholder with full and fair disclosure of all relevant facts concerning the offer and offeror. This disclosure provides the shareholder with an opportunity to make an informed decision of whether to accept or reject the offer. The Williams Act also
embodies a policy of evenhandedness and neutrality. This policy reflects congressional conviction that neither the offeror nor the target company management should
enjoy any advantage over the shareholder's decision-making process.
Note, supra note 2,at 255-56; see also Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender
Offers, 43 MD. L. REv. 240, 251 (1984) ("The disclosure provisions of the Williams Act were
intended by Congress to ensure that shareholders, after hearing from both the offeror and
target corporations with neither side having an unfair advantage over the other, would have
sufficient information to make informed decisions in determining whether to tender their
shares.").
81. 457 U.S. at 631 (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978))
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 526, 540-41 (1977).
82. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982) ("We, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals that
Congress sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary information but also by withholding from management or the bidder any undue advantage that
could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice.") (citing Dixon, 633 F.2d at 496).
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quirements and fair price provisions, clearly conflicts with the congressional objectives of neutrality and shareholder protection. The
statute will, in all likelihood, have the practical effect of discouraging two-tiered offers thereby securing the position of incumbent
management.8 3 The resultant disincentive to initiate tender offers,
caused by increased costs and risk, will ultimately deny stockholders both the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium and the
benefit of replacing inefficient management."4 Furthermore, the
Virginia statute reduces shareholder autonomy by giving disinterested directors the discretion either to avoid or submit to the statute's provisions,8 5 tilting the regulatory balance even more in favor
of target management. 86 For these reasons, the Virginia statute ap83. For the observation that "[a]n acquiror may be discouraged from making the initial
tender offer if he realizes that he may not be able to acquire one hundred percent of the
entity," see Murphy, supra note 1, at 126.
Many statutes employ similar provisions, such as supermajority voting provisions, to discourage takeover tender offers.
Supermajority provisions are the most widely adopted anti-takeover tactic. The requirement of a supermajority to accomplish certain changes in the corporation, such
as a merger or sale of assets, will raise the offeror's cost of acquiring control, will
make takeover difficult or impossible when management controls enough stock to
block the vote even if an offeror buys out all other shareholders, and may enable
management to arrange a friendly acquisition.
Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 2, at 121. Referring to a similar Maryland statute, one commentator states:
Supermajority provisions make it difficult and expensive to consummate a two-step
takeover. Were it not for the existence of the fair price provision, Maryland's
supermajority requirement could virtually give management a veto power over business combinations. Such a pro-management bias runs counter to the investor protection goal of the neutral stance of the Williams Act.
Note, supra note 64, at 464-65. For the position that the MITE majority "should have nullified the Illinois Act on supremacy clause grounds as well as on the commerce clause
grounds," see Note, supra note 50, at 244 (quoting Note, Edgar v. MITE Corp.: The Death
Knell for the Indiana Takeover Offers Act, 16 IND. L. REv. 517, 525 (1983)).

84. A more detailed discussion of the economic benefits provided to investors by an unhindered market for two-tiered takeovers has been reserved for the next section. See infra
text accompanying notes 88-105.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
86. See Sargent, supra note 52, at 694 ("[Aldministrative review of the substantive fairness of a takeover bid has been invalidated by some courts on the ground that such review
'is in conflict with the market approach and frustrates the express congressional intent that
the shareholdersmake their decisions.' "); Note, supra note 64, at 466-67 (arguing that the
Maryland law "replaces investor autonomy with a benevolent bureaucracy"); see also Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. on other
grounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Newlin & Gilmer, supra note
2, at 118. ("The Fifth Circuit found that Idaho's takeover law was preempted by the Williams Act because 'Congress intended for the investor to evaluate a tender offer; Idaho
[through a pre-offer notice requirement] asks the target company management to make that
decision on behalf of the shareholders.' ").
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pears to be inconsistent with the federal objectives
embodied in
7
the Williams Act and is thereby preempted.8
IV. A

MATTER OF STATE POLICY: VIRGINIA'S REJECTION OF THE
EFFICIENT MARKET MODEL

A.

The Economic Argument Against State Takeover Regulation

As noted earlier in this article,"" the constitutional and economic
issues raised by Virginia's takeover legislation can appropriately be
considered in tandem."9 However, the economic considerations are
significant enough to warrant independent attention here. An economic analysis premised on the "efficient capital market model"90
87. As one student commentator aptly concludes with regard to the Maryland model, after which the Virginia statute is patterned:
The Maryland statute clearly does provide some benefits. It eliminates the coercion
inherent in partial and two-tier offers by assuring nontendering shareholders a voice
in the second step or, at least, treatment no worse than that received by tendering
shareholders. These benefits are provided, however, at the expense of tender offerors
who are stripped of a useful acquisition technique and, more importantly, at the expense of those investors who desire to receive tender offers for their shares. The Maryland statute's potential anti-takeover effect cannot be reconciled with the concepts
of neutrality and investor protection in the Williams Act. The statute is incompatible
with congressional objectives in regulating tender offers and is therefore preempted.
Note, supra note 64, at 468-69. But see Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 2, at 291 (concluding
that "the constitutionality of the [Maryland] Act should be beyond doubt").
88. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
89. For an interesting discussion as to why analysis of second generation takeover statutes
must, by necessity, "draw upon the insights of economic analysis," see Sargent, supra note
64, at 33.
90. Professor Henry G. Manne was probably the first to apply this concept of financial
theory to various corporate law problems. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see also Dennis, supra note 72, at 308-09 (excellent discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the efficient market model). Professor
Dennis explained the efficient market model as follows:
The efficient market model posits that all public information is reflected in the
share price of a particular firm. This model portrays the operation of the stock market as an information exchange. The aggregate behavior of the market represents a
competitive equilibrium created by numerous buyers and sellers producing and
processing information. Individual investors may not have all the information available to the market and may not properly evaluate the relevant data, but the competition of the market produces an equilibrium price which represents an unbiased estimate of value based on current information.
The efficiency of management is an integral part of the mix of data known about
the firm. The value of a particular firm, as measured by the market, has two components-the value of the firm under current management and the discounted value of
a potential takeover at a premium price. Raiders must believe that by placing the
assets of the target firm under more efficient management, the aggregate value of
these two components will be increased. The target firm is only undervalued in that
present managers of the company are not likely to undertake other methods of man-
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is consistent with both congressional policy and general notions of
free enterprise. Such a view necessarily results in the conclusion
that corporate takeovers should be encouraged and that state takeover regulation of any lineage should be minimized.
Several general conclusions follow from the efficient market
model. First, an unrestricted market for corporate control increases
the potential for gain-producing transactions which ultimately
maximize the value of a target company's stock.9 1 Second, an active takeover market serves to monitor the performance of incumbent management as one component of the company's overall
value, and thus maintains a check on potentially poor management. 2 The bottom line is that corporate takeover activity should
agement which might create gains for the firm. There are several sources of the potential gain. Economies of scale or other operational synergies might be created. The
target might have liquid resources, including tax benefits, which the raider could
more profitably use. Finally the raider might be replacing inefficient managers. Bidders thus are not trying to beat the consensus judgment of the market about the
value of the target under current conditions but are changing a fundamental factor of
value by changing the control structures of the target.
Id. at 309-11. For Dennis' recent collection of literature on the efficient market model, see
Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix,
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373 (1984); see also Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); King, Market and Industry Factorsin Stock Price
Behavior, 39 J. Bus. L. 139 (1966) (empirical study of impact of information on stock price).
91. See Dennis, supra note 72, at 322. Professor Dennis acknowledges Professors Easterbrook and Fischel as the "leading academic defenders of two-tiered offers":
They take the position that shareholders should prefer legal rules that maximize
the value of all their holdings ex ante in the aggregate over rules which require ex
post equal treatment but which may reduce the number of gain sharing transactions.
They argue that unequal gain sharing might be necessary to accomplish many control
transactions . . . Under the Easterbrook-Fischel model, pretransaction market
value is the sole measure of whether a shareholder receives adequate compensation
for her investment. A shareholder must receive at least this amount of consideration
in any second step transaction.
Id. The most often cited works of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel include: Easterbrook
& Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel,
The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter The ProperRole], cited in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 643-44 (1982); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 94 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive
Tactics, and Shareholder Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981) (advocating a "do-nothing"
approach by target management when confronted with a tender offer); Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 Ttx. L. REV. 1 (1978).
92. The ProperRole, supra note 91, at 1169; ("The most probable explanation for unfriendly takeovers emphasizes their role in monitoring the performance of corporate managers. The tender bidding process polices managers whether or not a tender offer occurs, and
disciplines or replaces them if they stray too far from the service of the shareholders."); see
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in no way be discouraged-it increases shareholder welfare by driving stock prices to premium levels and by insuring that management commits company resources to their optimal use. Indeed, target management's role should be limited in takeover situations
and, furthermore, legislation which discourages takeover attempts
94
should be rejected. 93 Such would reflect "sound public policy.
While many commentators have contested this line of reasoning,95 support can be found in the legislative history of the Williams Act and in the MITE decision. Through enactment of the
Williams Act, Congress demonstrated its reliance on the "market
approach" to investor protection. e Indeed, as one commentator
observed:
also Note, supra note 50, at 227; Comment, supra note 4, at 826.
93. See Dennis, supra note 72, at 311; The ProperRole, supra note 91.
94. Dennis, supra note 72, at 341. Professor Dennis prefaced his article with the
observation:
[E]ncouraging an active market for corporate control is sound public policy. While
inefficient managers can be disciplined by several forces-the product market, the
employment market, and the shareholder-initiated regulation through proxy fights or
legal mechanisms-, the market for corporate control is an important ingredient in
insuring that society's resources are used to their fullest potential. An active market
for corporate control encourages the replacement of inefficient managers and creates
synergies between firms.
Id. at 283.
The MITE Court recognized the benefits of unregulated tender offer activity in its commerce clause analysis. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-44 (citing The ProperRole, supra note
91); see also Note, At the Crossroads of Corporate Takeover Legislation, 63 NEB. L. REV.
345, 359 n.94 (1984).
95. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Lowenstein, supra note 52; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 2;
Note, supra note 59, at 388 ("The best way to insure adequate protection is to effectively
regulate second step transactions in two-tiered takeovers.").
96. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom.
on other grounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 433 U.S. 173 (1979); see also Note, supra
note 64, at 449-50 ("The [Kidwell] court stated that Congress recognized that tender offers
often benefit individual investors and thus Congress advocated a narrow regulatory role in
the tender offer area."). See generally Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the
Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1100-14 (1982).
[T]he correct view of the Williams Act lies close to the "market approach" view. The
"market approach" view recognizes the interrelatedness of neutrality and the Williams Act's concept of investor protection. The legislative history of the Act indicates
that Congress believed that a neutral balance between tender offers and target management would benefit investors by preserving their opportunity to receive attractive
tender offers and by providing a check on inefficient management.
Note, supra note 64, at 452 (citing 113 CONG. REc. 24,665 (1967)); see also Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Congress perceived neutrality and investor protection as integrated principles), aff'd sub
nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624; Note, supra note 94, at 357 n.87.
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[T]he courts have emphasized that the underlying purpose of the
Williams Act is the protection of investors and that Congress intended to protect investors by ensuring adequate and timely disclosure of material information about the takeover bid so that the investor may make an informed decision. This "market approach," as
the legislative history of the Williams Act seems to show, reflected
Congress' belief that investor protection does not require prevention
of takeovers since some takeovers may, in fact,
or discouragement
97
investors.
benefit

Similarly, the MITE Court referred in its preemption analysis to
the Williams Act legislative history and concluded that "Congress
intended for investors to be free to make their own decisions."9 In
addition, the opinion recognized that tender offer activity provides
the benefits of high stock prices and positive management incentive.99 While Congress and the judiciary have not expressly
adopted the efficient market model, it seems fair to say that congressional policy, as interpreted by the courts, is consistent with
that modern economic theory.
B.

Shareholder Protection or Economic Parochialism?

One should consider whether Virginia's persistence with regard
to regulating two-tiered tender offers is grounded in concern for
the welfare of minority shareholders or in a fear that, given the
current takeover trend, many Virginia companies will eventually
be controlled by out-of-state interests. 10 0 Even if the objective of
97. Sargent, supra note 52, at 693 (citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967)
and H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968), both reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1017).
98. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640. The Court stated: "[T]he state thus offers investor protection
at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach quite in conflict with that adopted by
Congress." Id. (quoting Dixon, 633 F.2d at 494).
99. Id. at 643; see also supra note 68.
100. For the observation that while the first motive for Virginia's antitakeover statute
"was a growing concern about the unfairness to minority shareholders," the second motive
"was the desire to protect Virginia Corporations from certain takeover tactics," see Murphy,
supra note 1, at 124. A similar statement was made about Maryland's statute:
[I]f the true purpose of the [Maryland] statute is to insulate in-state corporations
at the expense of national markets for corporate acquisition, the commerce clause
prohibits the advancement of such parochial interests. A number of commentators
have suggested that first generation statutes are designed to promote economic protectionism. The Maryland approach may have a substantial anti-takeover effect and
may be subject to the same economic protectionism claim.
Note, supra note 64, at 457. Another commentator notes:
It has been observed that "[a] number of states apparently feared that established
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Article 14 is to moderate the coercive impact of two-tiered takeovers, 10 1 the statute nonetheless benefits incumbent management
more than shareholders as a class. The disinterested directors are
afforded the discretion of deciding when the statute will apply' 02
and, thus, which takeover attempts will enjoy success. And while
the benefits of a free market are withheld from shareholders, the
decrease in the number of takeover attempts will only leave management more secure.' 0
Finally, if shareholder welfare is truly at the heart of the statute,
the crucial distinction between shareholder interests and those of
incumbent management has obviously been either discounted or
ignored. Shareholders are interested in a high return on their investment, which can frequently be better achieved through corporate takeovers. In contrast, management is concerned with job security'0 4 and thus may view an active takeover market as a
threat. 05 Experience has shown that incumbent management is
usually acting in its own interest when it takes measures necessary
to deflect a potential takeover. This motivation increases the potentiality that valid shareholder interests will be sacrificed. Because the respective interests of shareholders and management are
local concerns might, through the tender offer device, be taken over by outside interThis
ests who would then close down plants and leave local residents jobless ....
purpose may . . . be inferred from the fact that the majority of acts exempt offers
approved by management.
Wilner & Landy, supra note 48, at 18; see also Note, supra note 2, at 274-75; Note, supra
note 60, at 1159.
101. See supra note 45.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
103. For the suggestion that second generation statutes may "eliminate or significantly
reduce the number of partial and two-step takeover bids" and "function like legislatively
enacted shark repellants, preventing certain kinds of takeovers from being launched at all
and perhaps reducing the aggregate number of takeovers," see Sargent, supra note 64, at 27.
104. See Comment, Front-End Loaded, supra note 4, at 821 ("In resisting takeover attempts,. . . officers and directors often are motivated simply by a desire to keep themselves
in control of the target corporation."). Professor Steinberg recognizes the inherent conflict
of interest in affording management authority over the takeover process. Steinberg, supra
note 80, at 243 ("[T]arget management is likely to have a disabling conflict of interest. ...
Directors and officers of the target corporation know that they are likely to be replaced if an
offer succeeds.").
105. Comment, Front-End Loaded, supra note 4, at 826 ("Because an active takeover
market encourages removal of inefficient managers, any policy that inhibits takeovers is detrimental to the welfare of shareholders."); see Note, supra note 50, at 227 (shareholders
benefit from the incentive for increased effectiveness of management that the threat of a
tender offer provides). See generally Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal,26 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1983) (discussing separation of ownership and
control in modern public corporation).
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divergent with regard to potential takeovers, a statute demonstrating pro-management bias clearly cannot insure shareholder
welfare.
V.

CONCLUSION: TAKING THE GLOvES OFF

The enactment of Virginia's second generation antitakeover statute is consistent with the burgeoning efforts of various states to
provide attractive environments for incorporations of new businesses and reincorporations of existing companies. Thus, it is not
surprising to note both that the affiliated transactions provision
was given an earlier effective date than the rest of the statutory
framework into which it was inserted" 6 and that Virginia had, in
1984, greatly liberalized the permissible scope of indemnification
which corporations could afford their officers and directors. 10 7 One
hopes it would be an overstatement to conclude from these developments that Virginia has joined the "race to the bottom,"' 0 8 but
examination of Virginia's antitakeover statute indicates the question is open.
The "Affiliated Transactions" statute is artfully drafted to appear merely as regulation of the intracorporate affairs of Virginia
corporations. Moreover, it is buried in the midst of the new Stock
Corporation Act provisions dealing with matters such as the formation'08 and dissolution ' 0 of corporations. The drafters gave it
the innocuous title of "Affiliated Transactions."
Irrespective of its label and its placement within the statutory
framework, Virginia's provision dealing with so-called "Affiliated
Transactions" is an antitakeover statute. As such, it clearly conflicts with the purpose of the Williams Act which, as expressed by
Justice White in Edgar v. MITE Corp., was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder."' Moreover, inasmuch as
many of the shareholders sought to be "protected" by the statute
106. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-601 to -777 (Repl. Vol. 1985).

107. See id. §§ 13.1-696 to -704.
108. Corporate law commentators use the term "race to the bottom" to describe the trend
of state legislatures to relax restrictions on corporations, enabling management to operate
with minimum interference in order to create a hospitable environment for the incorporation and operation of businesses. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-

tions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664-66 (1974).
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-618 to -625.
110. Id. §§ 13.1-742 to -756.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 78-87.
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are not Virginia residents, and given that the undeniable effect of
the statute will be to impede the takeover efforts of foreign corporations, the aim of the statute is not merely regulation of the internal corporate affairs of Virginia corporations. Indeed, its extraterritorial reach infects it with the same malady as was deemed fatal to
the first generation statute in Tdlvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw;namely, it
impermissibly burdens interstate commerce." 2 Finally, if the drafters' purpose truly was to insure that minority shareholders will receive fair value for their shares in the event of merger, then their
efforts may be unnecessary in light of the rights already afforded
by statute in Virginia to dissenting shareholders."'
112. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
113. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-729 to -741.
Any discussion involving corporate takeovers and minority shareholders brings to mind
the notion of the "appraisal remedy" or "dissenters' rights." Consistent with former law, the
new Virginia Stock Corporation Act provides so-called "dissenters' rights" to shareholders
entitled to vote on mergers, share exchanges or sales of assets. See id. However characterized, such rights generally entitle shareholders to dissent from certain extraordinary corporate transactions and to obtain payment of the "fair value" of their shares. Id. § 13.1730(A). As the Joint Bar Committee Commentary (Introductory Comment) to the Virginia
Stock Corporation Act points out, these dissenters' rights are, in effect, the shareholders'
exclusive remedy since as "[a] shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his
shares may not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement unless the action is
unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation." Id. § 13.1730(B); see also HousE AND SENATE DOCUMENTS OF VIRGINIA, REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA CODE
COMMISSION, HOUSE Doc. No. 13, at 272 (1985). Characterization of the rights as "dissenters'," as opposed to "appraisal," rights was consistent with the General Assembly's intent to
minimize the technicalities, delay and expense of traditional appraisal statutes. Making such
rights the shareholders' exclusive remedy was thought to provide more protection to the
corporation "from suits by dissenters who either have a fanciful notion of their shares' value
or who attack the transaction giving rise to dissenters' rights for purposes of obtaining a

nuisance settlement."

VIRGINIA CORPORATION LAW,

supra note 45, at 235 (Introductory Com-

ment to Joint Board Committee Commentary).
While a thorough coverage of the "appraisal remedy" is beyond the scope of this article,
several aspects of the dissenters' rights provisions of the Virginia statutes warrant comment.
First, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(C)(3) excludes "affiliated transactions" as defined in § 13.1725 from the statute's otherwise general denial of dissenters' rights to certain larger publicly
traded companies. Thus, it is apparent that the drafters of the new Act were cognizant of
the interplay between the traditional appraisal remedy and the newly created "rights" afforded minority shareholders under the affiliated transactions provision. Second, the dissenters' rights provision would compensate dissenting shareholders with some notion of
"fair value." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(A). To the extent that the definition of "fair value"
excludes "any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless
exclusion would be inequitable," such provision for dissenters' rights proves less beneficial
to minority shareholders. Id. § 13.1-729. In any event, if the affiliated transactions provision
is primarily intended to protect minority shareholders by guaranteeing some measure of fair
value for their shares, the authors would ask what it accomplishes in that regard over and
above dissenters' rights? Any advantages to minority shareholders provided by the affiliated
transactions provisions, such as the assurance of a cash payment, could have been provided
them more simply by amendment to the dissenters' rights provisions and at less expense to
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In the final analysis, Virginia's "Affiliated Transactions" statute
must be judged by its true substance and not merely its form. It
appears undeniable that the purpose and effect of the statute is to
impede hostile takeover attempts of corporations organized and incorporated in Virginia. This being so, the statute upsets the delicate balance so carefully prescribed and maintained by federal law
and, thus, the true purpose of the statute portends its ultimate
demise.
ADDENDUM
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America

If the value of legal commentary increases with its timeliness, so
too does the risk that its premises and conclusions will be rejected
by the final arbiter in the land. On April 21, 1987, the United
States Supreme Court decided CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America,"4 declaring Indiana's antitakeover law to be constitutional under both the supremacy and commerce clauses. In an
opinion by Justice Powell, the court declined to embrace the efficient market model advanced by the authors and others, and concluded that the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter of Indiana's
Business Corporation Law protects shareholders from coercion and
affects interstate commerce only to a limited extent. The decision
is significant for Virginia's affiliated transactions statute because
Indiana's antitakeover law, like Virginia's, closely tracks the Maryland approach."'
An in-depth critique of the reasoning and probable impact of the
CTS decision, as well as analysis of the distinctions between the
Indiana and Virginia statutes, is left to other commentators. The
authors must, however, comment on the broader ramifications of a
decision which they find fascinating but wrong. First, though, sevan otherwise active takeover market. For a more in depth discussion of the appraisal remedy
and problems with valuation, see generally Coleman, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate
Freeze-Outs: Quests of Valuation and Exclusivity, 38 Sw. L.J. 775 (1984); Macrae, Dissenting Stockholders' Rights in Virginia: Exclusivity of the Cash-Out Remedy and Determination of "FairValue," 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 505 (1978); Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and
the "New" Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 415 (1984); Note, "FairValue" Determination in Corporate "Freeze-Outs" and in Security and Exchange Act Suits; Weinberger,
Other, and Better Methods, 19 VAL. U.L. REv. 521 (1985).
114. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Associate Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's
judgment and wrote separately.
115. See supra note 2.
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eral aspects of the Court's opinion should be noted.
A.

The Divided Opinion

The CTS decision will certainly be noted as a retreat from the
preemption analysis employed in MITE: "As the plurality opinion
in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the Court, we
are not bound by its reasoning."11 CTS also represents a noteworthy departure from the MITE majority's commerce clause analysis, 117 which employed terms such as "economic resources," "effi-

ciency," and "competition."
Inasmuch as dissenting opinions often provide the catalyst for
legal debate and judicial reexamination, attention should be paid
the dissenting opinion of Justice White in CTS:
The majority today upholds Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions
Chapter, a statute which will predictably foreclose completely some
tender offers for stock in Indiana corporations. I disagree with the
conclusion that the Chapter is neither pre-empted by the Williams
Act nor in conflict with the Commerce Clause. The Chapter undermines the policy of the Williams Act by effectively preventing minority shareholders, in some circumstances, from acting in their own
best interests by selling their stock. In addition, the Chapter will
substantially burden the interstate market in corporate ownership,
particularly if other States follow Indiana's lead as many already
have done. The Chapter, therefore, directly inhibits interstate commerce, the very economic consequences the Commerce Clause was
intended to prevent. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is far more
persuasive than that of the
majority today, and the judgment of that
18s
court should be affirmed.
While the authors agree with the dissenting opinion, they observe that the dissent departs from the economic reasoning
adopted in this article and focuses on the distinction between protection of individual shareholders and protection of shareholders
as a group."' In any event, the authors approve the dissent's recognition of the "practical impact" of the Indiana law, the dissent's
116. 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
117. See supra text accompanying notes § 59-68.
118. 107 S. Ct. at 1653-54 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Justices

Blackmun and Stevens.
119. Id.
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concern for "economic protectionism," and its implicit rejection of
a "form over substance" approach to constitutional analysis.12 0
B.

Questionable ConstitutionalJurisprudence

CTS reflects a fundamental difference of opinion regarding the
premise underlying the authors' thesis-that constitutional analysis of state takeover legislation necessitates consideration of the economic desirability of an unrestricted market for corporate control.
As candidly admitted by Justice Powell in the majority opinion,
the real issue presented in CTS extends beyond any narrow question regarding the desirability or propriety of the Indiana statute.
Indeed, it appears fair to say that the essence of the Court's reasoning is embodied in Justice Powell's declaration that "The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular
economic theory.' 1 21 While this statement may seem innocuous
enough, statements made by the Court in passing sometimes have
a way of evolving into doctrine. The implications of any such doctrine would be significant and somewhat frightening.
For obvious reasons, those few questions which are the subject of
specific constitutional language rarely find their way to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court can sidestep virtually every constitutional issue presented to it by merely declaring, as in CTS, that
the Constitution does not require or proscribe the particular action
or inaction in controversy. Traditionally, however, the Court has
not availed itself of this escape hatch. Indeed, the Court has, on
many occasions, grappled with difficult questions of social and economic policy, the specifics of which are not even remotely addressed in the Constitution. Thus, the Court's statement in CTS
that the Constitution does not embody any particular economic
theory is, at best, unsatisfying.
When confronted with fundamental questions not addressed in
the Constitution, the Court has routinely examined societal norms
and precepts in reaching its decisions. Examples include the following issues: 1) whether the individual has the right to decide to
use contraceptives or to abort a pregnancy; 2) whether the govern120. See 107 S. Ct. at 1654-55. The majority implicitly exalts the form of a corporate law
over its substance: "No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established
than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define
the voting rights of shareholders." Id. at 1649.
121. 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
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ment may make reference to God on its coins and currency; and
more recently, 3) whether the state may proscribe certain homosexual conduct. In these and many other cases, the Court has
based its decisions, not upon any express language in the Constitution, but rather upon what it perceives to be fundamental values
comprising the very fabric of American society. In deciding these
questions, the Court has concluded that the following basic American values mandate certain outcomes: 1) a commitment to the individual's right to a measure of privacy; 2) a belief that ours is
fundamentally a religious nation notwithstanding the anti-establishment clause; and 3) the notion that certain homosexual conduct
is sufficiently aberrant that it may be proscribed. Whether one
agrees with any of these conclusions or not, the fact remains that
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence has always relied on fundamental principles nowhere appearing in the Constitution.
If we are prepared to permit reference to a deity on our currency
because we perceive ourselves to be a fundamentally religious nation; and if it is permissible for the states to proscribe certain homosexual practices because they have historically been viewed as a
gross deviation from the norm, can we then deny that American
societal structure does not presuppose some form of capitalist economic system? To be sure, an enormous amount of economic regulation is permissible within our system. Moreover, Justice Scalia's
statement in his concurring opinion in CTS that "[a] law can be
both economic folly and constitutional" is probably true. 2 Nevertheless, it is quite a different matter to declare that the states are
free to adopt whatever economic system which the vicissitudes of
time and the whims of state legislatures indicate is politically or
economically expedient, without regard to the supremacy and commerce clauses of the constitution. 2 3 While legislation may permissibly constitute "economic folly," any such legislation exceeds the
constitutional limit when it imposes substantial burdens on the
free market without advancing a legitimate and important state
objective.
The authors do not advocate a return to the jurisprudence of the
122. 107 S. Ct. at 1653. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I do not share the Court's apparent high

estimation of the beneficence of the state statute at issue here.") For a pointed discussion of
the suspect political motivations underlying the enactment of some states' takeover legislation, see Romano, State Takeover Laws: Constitutional But Dumb, Wall St. J., May 14,
1987, at 28.
123. See supra note 9.
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Lochner era 124 when the Court routinely invalidated state eco-

nomic legislation as being beyond the scope of the state's police
power. There exists, however, a vast and fertile middle ground between the statement that the Constitution does not embrace any
particular economic theory, and the invalidation of any state statute which may have an impact on interstate commerce.
The authors do not purport to know what the CTS decision
portends, either in the narrower area of corporate law or in the
considerably broader arena of constitutional jurisprudence. A divided Court in CTS questioned the rationale of the sharply fragmented MITE Court, yet specifically declined to overrule the latter
decision. Therefore, neither opinion can be regarded as a clear pronouncement of the law governing state takeover legislation.125 Accordingly, the debate continues and critics of the Virginia statute
are left to attack the rationale of a divided Supreme Court, to distinguish Virginia's law from Indiana's, and to call for a resurrection of MITE.

124. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Interestingly, Justice Powell's suggestion
in CTS that the Constitution does not prescribe any particular economic theory is consonant with Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner. In disagreeing with the majority in that case,
Justice Holmes observed: "[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire." 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
125. The lineup of justices in MITE demonstrates that the present state of the law is
unclear. There, Justice Powell concurred in the majority's view, as expressed by Justice
White, that the Illinois statute offended the commerce clause. Conversely, in CTS, Justice
Powell parted company with Justice White on the commerce clause analysis, concluding
that the Indiana statute did not sufficiently burden interstate commerce to require its invalidation on constitutional grounds.

